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Abstract Despite well-established results in survey methodology, many exper-
imental philosophers have not asked whether and in what way conclusions
about folk intuitions follow from people’s responses to their surveys. Rather,
they appear to have proceeded on the assumption that intuitions can be simply
read off from survey responses. Survey research, however, is fraught with
difficulties. I review some of the relevant literature—particularly focusing
on the conversational pragmatic aspects of survey research—and consider
its application to common experimental philosophy surveys. I argue for two
claims. First, that experimental philosophers’ survey methodology leaves the
facts about folk intuitions massively underdetermined; and second, that what
has been regarded as evidence for the instability of philosophical intuitions is,
at least in some cases, better accounted for in terms of subjects’ reactions to
subtle pragmatic cues contained in the surveys.
1 Experimental Philosophers’ Methodology
We will be concerned with a methodology that is common to a great deal of
work that has gone under the label of experimental philosophy. To be sure,
not all experimental philosophers employ or endorse this methodology; but its
use is widespread, so carefully examining it is an important task.
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How do experimental philosophers describe what they are doing? Here is
what Nadelhoffer and Nahmias say:
Experimental [philosophers] use the methods of experimental psychology
to probe the way people make judgments that bear on debates in philos-
ophy (2007, p. 123, my emphasis).
Here is Shaun Nichols:
Recently, researchers have begun to exploit social scientif ic methodolo-
gies to characterize folk concepts. . . . A second approach . . . applies the
methods of cross-cultural psychology to philosophical intuitions (2004,
p. 154, my emphasis).
And Nahmias et al.:
Philosophers working in the nascent field of ‘experimental philosophy’
have begun using methods borrowed from psychology to collect data
about folk intuitions . . . (2005, p. 123, my emphasis).
And Joshua Knobe:
The new field of experimental philosophy seeks to subject [philoso-
phers’ claims about folk intuitions] to rigorous tests using the traditional
methods of cognitive science—systematic experimentation and statistical
analysis (2007, p. 81, my emphasis).
And Alexander and Weinberg:
Experimental philosophers are unified behind . . . the application of meth-
ods of experimental psychology to the study of the nature of intuitions
(2007, p. 56, my emphasis).
There are many more examples, but the reader will already have noticed the
common theme: experimental philosophers say they’re doing science. They are
applying methods “borrowed from psychology”—or “social science”, or “cog-
nitive science”, or “cross-cultural psychology”, or “experimental psychology”,
or . . . —to the study of folk intuitions. It’s time we asked, Is this really so?
In their seminal contribution to the “restrictionist programme” (Alexander
and Weinberg 2007), Weinberg et al. (2006) characterised philosophers who
rely on their own intuitions to support normative philosophical claims as
“Intuition Driven Romanticists”. Intuition Driven Romanticists in the theory
of knowledge hold that
knowledge of the correct epistemic norms . . . is implanted within us in
some way, and with the proper process of self-exploration we can discover
them (ibid., p. 194).
Weinberg et al. are concerned that analytic philosophers continue to
naïvely assume—indeed, in the face of apparently clear empirical data to the
contrary—that they can read off facts about what ‘we’ find intuitive simply by
consulting their own intuitions. While I share their concern, I believe there is a
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parallel problem with experimental philosophers’ methodology—which I call
“Survey-Driven Romanticism”. According to Survey-Driven Romanticism,
people’s philosophical intuitions are implanted within them in some way,
and by administering simple surveys we can discover them.
Examples where experimental philosophers appear to directly read off folk
intuitions from survey responses abound, so my choice must be somewhat
arbitrary.
Nahmias et al. take it that
negative responses [to a survey depicting an agent in a deterministic
world] indicate the intuition that determinism conflicts with free will and
responsibility (2005, p. 565).
Joshua Knobe claims to
begin with some straightforward data about people’s intuitions concern-
ing specific cases (2006, p. 205, my emphasis).
Swain et al. claim to have demonstrated that
intuitions vary according to [the order in which] thought experiments are
considered (2008, p. 153).
Weinberg et al. claim that
what we’ve been reporting are just the brute facts that intuitions in
different groups differ (2006, p. 215, my emphasis).
Machery et al. simply assert that their surveys
modeled on Kripke’s Gödel case . . . elicit culturally variable intuitions
(2004, B7).
Machery et al. consider the
extreme but very live possibility [that] individuals might have [certain] in-
tuitions on some occasions and [conflicting intuitions] on other occasions
[ibid., B8],
but they hardly pause for the more mild possibility that the differences
in their subjects’ survey responses mightn’t reflect underlying differences in
philosophically-interesting intuitions at all.
All this has been a serious mistake; we must distinguish intuitions from
survey responses. This does not require any detailed account of what intuitions
are, so let us grant that they are judgments whose contents are “singular
classificational propositions, to the effect that [X is a case of C]” (Goldman
and Pust 1998, p. 182). Survey responses are a kind of behaviour generated by
several different inputs, only one of which might be a judgment of the kind
described by Goldman and Pust. Other inputs are the background beliefs a
respondent draws on when interpreting the vignette; her beliefs about what
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the researchers are interested in; her sensitivity to conversational norms; and
so forth.
Experimental philosophers can effectively equate survey responses with in-
tuitions only by ignoring the established social and cognitive science literature
on survey methodology. In my review of the growing body of experimental
philosophy literature I have found just one reference to a serious discussion
of survey methodology.1 The conclusion to be drawn is that, despite their
pretensions, many experimental philosophers have given no serious thought to
methodology. This not only undermines their claim to be doing science, as we
shall see, it often leaves the philosophical significance of their findings unclear.
It is true that when a philosopher says “We find X intuitive” (“we find
it natural to say X”), she does not mean “I find X intuitive”, and she does
not, in general, mean “We philosophers find X intuitive”. Rather, she means
that competent, thoughtful speakers would, under certain circumstances, find
X intuitive. Experimental philosophers are right to emphasise that appeals
to intuition typically engender empirical commitments. And they are right
to suspect that what philosophers find intuitive might diverge, possibly quite
often, from what lay-people find intuitive. Our concern, then, is not with the
aims of experimental philosophy; rather, it is with experimental philosophers’
methods and the deeply mistaken assumptions which underlie them.
2 Asking Different Questions Yields Different Answers
Antti Kauppinen recently drew attention to the dubiousness of the unmedi-
ated inference from survey results to intuitions. In his (2007) critique of
experimental philosophy, Kauppinen hypothesised that both pragmatic and
semantic factors play an important role in generating subjects’ responses to
experimental philosophy surveys. If experimental philosophers are interested
in folk concepts, he argued, then they need to distinguish the genuinely
semantic contribution to survey responses from the influences of pragmatic
distractions.
On this score I agree with Kauppinen, and the experiments presented here
support his concern. But he is pessimistic that semantic and pragmatic factors
can be experimentally distinguished:
On Grice’s view, conversational implicatures are essentially such that
they can be worked out, given the assumption of conversational
cooperation and facts about the context, including mutual beliefs . . . But
1Searching all of the electronic scholarly resources accessible from Melbourne University—
which include all major philosophy, psychology, social and cognitive science journals—for the
terms [“experimental philosophy” “survey methodology”] turned up only two results, neither
of which contained a discussion of survey methodology. Searching for [Schwarz “Experimental
philosophy”] yielded two additional results: Goldman and Pust (1998) who cite Schwarz (1995) in
their defence of intuitions; and Doris et al. (2007) who cite Schwarz (1996).
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when a person responds to a yes/no survey question (or rates assent on
a Likert scale), just what is the conversational context? Who is he or she
conversing with, and how do we work out what he or she assumes about
the hearer’s beliefs? Frankly, this is a baffling task. Once again, an actual
dialogue would help, but it would mean leaving behind the Survey Model
and its pretension to scientific objectivity (ibid., p. 107).
Agreed: Questions about how the conversational context of the experimen-
tal setting and the formal features of the survey influence subject responses
urgently need to be worked out. But I’m not sure why Kauppinen thinks they
are so intractable.
Here is one answer to Kauppinen’s questions which social and cognitive
scientists have developed in considerable detail over the past two decades: the
context in which a person answers a yes/no survey question or rates assent
on a Likert scale is essentially that of a conversation—albeit a rather one-
sided one—between researcher and experimental subject. Such conversations
proceed according to the usual conventions of language use and the ordinary
norms of conversation (Schwarz 1995, 1996). It is on this self-consciously
Gricean model which survey researchers have developed the “science of asking
questions” (Schaeffer and Presser 2003).2
Norbert Schwarz provides a beautiful demonstration of how non-semantic
features can profoundly impact how subjects interpret a survey questionnaire.
Consider the following two formally equivalent rating scales:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
Schwarz’s surveys asked subjects “How successful would you say you have
been in life?” In one survey the response scale ranged from 0 = ‘Not at all
successful’ to 10 = ‘Extremely successful’; and in a second survey the scale
ranged from −5 = ‘Not at all successful’ to +5 = ‘Extremely successful’.
Schwarz found that “whereas 34% of the respondents endorsed a value
below the mid-point of the 0 to 10 scale, only 13% endorsed one of the
formally equivalent values on the −5 to 5 scale” (p < .001) (Schwarz 1995,
p. 157). The phrase “not at all successful” is ambiguous between an absence
of noteworthy successes and the presence of explicit failures. Licensed by
conversational norms, respondents turn to the context of the question—the
numeric labelling—to infer which meaning the researcher has in mind.
It is crucial to note that without an appreciation of how respondents draw
on contextual information to determine the meaning of the question (viz., the
researcher’s speaker meaning), these results would appear to indicate that
responses are highly sensitive to “irrelevant factors”. But they are not. The
apparently straightforward question “How successful would you say you have
2For an overview, see Krosnick (1999).
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been in life?” asks something quite different in different contexts. It is not
literal meaning which matters to respondents—it’s speaker meaning, and this
crucially depends on context.
∗ ∗ ∗
Experimental philosophy surveys provide many opportunities for unwittingly
communicating valuable contextual information to subjects. Consider, for
example, the following survey vignette which Weinberg et al. used in their
(2006) study on epistemic intuitions:3
Dave likes to play a game with flipping a coin. He sometimes gets a
“special feeling” that the next flip will come out heads. When he gets
this “special feeling”, he is right about half the time, and wrong about
half the time. Just before the next flip, Dave gets that “special feeling”,
and the feeling leads him to believe that the coin will land heads. He flips
the coin, and it does land heads.
Did Dave really know that the coin was going to land heads, or did he
only believe it?
REALLY KNOWS ONLY BELIEVES
Reading this survey, you may have noticed a number of peculiarities. First,
the words special feeling are consistently enclosed in quotation marks; and
since these are used according to several different conventions which differ
in their implicatures, this introduces a certain ambiguity. Do Weinberg et al.
mean to quote Dave directly? Or are they expressing in print what we might
express in speech with exaggerated articulation or by adding the words ‘so-
called’ in the appropriate places? To people who find the latter interpretation
most natural, Weinberg et al. would seem to be very purposefully expressing
their own dim opinion of the epistemic propriety of Dave’s special feelings.
Second, the intensifying adverb really in the question (“Did Dave really
know . . . ”) and in the first response alternative (“REALLY KNOWS”) raises
the standard for answering that Dave knew the coin would turn up heads.
Conversely, the downtoning adverb only in the question (“. . . or did he only
believe it?”) and in the second possible answer (“ONLY BELIEVES”) lowers
the standard for answering that Dave only believed.
Third, presenting “only believes” as an alternative response to “really
knows” communicates Weinberg et al.’s own belief that the distinction
between real knowledge and (mere) belief is highly pertinent.
Though little differences like these might seem trivial to you and me, to
someone struggling to understand and intelligently respond to an experimental
philosophy survey they could be richly meaningful. Subjects rely on the
assumption that we researchers are cooperative communicators, that we mean
to provide for their consideration only what we believe to be relevant to their
3Nichols et al. use the same survey in their (2003), as do Swain et al. (2008).
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task of generating responses. This leads subjects to look for meaning in the
survey’s form as well as its explicit content.
The experiments presented in the next section all concern examples where
the survey’s formal structure systematically influences subjects’ responses,
often strikingly. But before we turn to them, I want to suggest a plausible expla-
nation for the power pragmatic influences wield on experimental philosophers’
survey results. Many experimental philosophers want their “intuition probes—
the cases that we ask subjects to judge—to be similar to cases that have
actually been used in the recent literature” (Weinberg et al. 2006, p. 202). Thus,
following in the tradition of contemporary thought-experiments, experimental
philosophers have invented some stunningly bizarre survey vignettes. Such
vignettes are probably harmless within the explicit conversational contexts
in which philosophers consider thought-experiments, and they make doing
armchair philosophy fun. But when transposed into the far more ambiguous
context of an experimental survey, continuing this tradition has been a dis-
aster. Convoluted thought-experiments are ripe with opportunities for con-
fusing subjects, breaching conversational norms, and inadvertently conveying
information which, in their effort to provide intelligent responses, subjects
mistakenly interpret meaningfully.
The problem is doubly serious for experimental philosophers since people
tend to rely most heavily on contextual and pragmatic cues when the meaning
of the survey or their task is unclear (see, e.g., Schwarz 1995, 1996; Strack
et al. 1988; Krosnick 1999). Indeed, experimental philosophy subjects are ipso
facto at a significant disadvantage since it is often a precondition of their
participation that they have no idea why anyone would be interested in finding
out what the folk think about Gettier scenarios, much less what a Gettier-
scenario actually is (see, e.g., Machery et al. 2004, B8-9).
2.1 Are Intuitions Sensitive to the Order in Which Cases Are Considered?
In the previous example from Weinberg et al.’s study, I noted several features,
internal to both the vignette and question, which subjects might draw on in
an effort to understand and respond to an experimental philosophy survey.
Subjects can also extract meaning from the context surrounding the question,
which can include other vignettes included in the survey. In their recent paper,
Swain et al. (2008) exploit this sensitivity to argue for another “irrelevant
factor” to which intuitions are supposedly sensitive: intuitions vary, they
maintain, according to the order in which cases are considered.
In Swain et al.’s experiment one group of subjects were primed with a
vignette about Karen, “a distinguished professor of chemistry”. Karen learns
from “a leading scientific journal that mixing two common floor disinfectants,
Cleano Plus and Washaway, will create a poisonous gas that is deadly to
humans” (p. 154). As a result, Karen comes to believe that mixing these
disinfectants creates a poisonous gas; and the idea is, her belief is an ob-
vious case of knowledge. A second group of subjects were primed using
Weinberg et al.’s story about Dave, who occasionally gets a special feeling as
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to whether a coin will turn up heads or tails. The idea is, Dave’s belief that
the coin will next turn up heads is an obvious case of non-knowledge. Subjects
in both groups were asked to indicate on a 5-point Likert scale the extent to
which they agreed or disagreed with a claim attributing knowledge to either
Karen or Dave.
Having been primed with one of the vignettes and the task of assessing the
epistemic status of its protagonist’s belief, subjects in each group responded
to a more problematic vignette based on Lehrer’s (1990) Truetemp thought-
experiment:
One day Charles was knocked out by a falling rock; as a result his
brain was “rewired” so that he is always right whenever he estimates
the temperature where he is. Charles is unaware that his brain has been
altered in this way. A few weeks later, this brain rewiring leads him to
believe that it is 71 degrees in his room. Apart from his estimation, he has
no other reasons to think that it is 71 degrees. In fact, it is 71 degrees.
Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following
claim: “Charles knows that it is 71 degrees in his room”.
 Strongly agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, Strongly disagree
Swain et al. found that reading about Dave’s special feelings first means
you’ll be a little more likely to accord Charles knowledge than had you not
read about Dave, and reading about Karen first means you’ll be a little less
likely to accord Charles knowledge than had you not read about Karen.
Swain et al. conclude: subjects’ “intuitions about the Truetemp case reverse
direction depending on whether the case is presented after a case of clear non-
knowledge” (ibid., p. 144, my emphasis).
How do Swain et al. arrive at this conclusion? By manipulating certain
features of their experiments which they deem “irrelevant”, they are able
to affect a slight but statistically significant influence on the mean response
to Charles’ case. On this basis they conclude that their subjects’ “intuitions
track more than just the philosophically-relevant content of the thought-
experiments”. Now it is surely true, as Swain et al. have demonstrated, that
survey responses track more than just the philosophically-relevant content of
the vignettes—but it is a fallacy to conclude on this basis alone that intuitions
do too.
Schwarz et al. (1991) and other survey researchers have developed a so-
phisticated framework for understanding assimilation and contrast effects in
part-whole question sequences in terms of Gricean conversational norms. A
part-whole question is one where a specific question is followed by a general
one. For example, if I ask “Do you enjoy eating junk-food?” immediately
after having asked whether you enjoy eating Jelly-beans, you will interpret
my second question as asking “Do you enjoy eating junk-food other than
Jelly-beans?” The reason for this appears to be rather simple: if you interpret
the second question literally it constitutes a request for redundant information
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(since Jelly-beans are a subset of junk-food). This would violate Grice’s Maxim
of Quantity: speakers are assumed to make their requests and contributions to
conversation as informative as required and not more so. Having been primed
with the specific question, you simply interpret the general question in line with
everyday conversational norms—as requesting new information. The implied
meaning of the question “Do you enjoy eating junk-food?” varies depending
on which question precedes it.
I want to suggest that something similar is responsible for Swain et al.’s
results: the implied meaning of the primed question about Charles varies
depending on the context in which it occurs. It is not that the subjects in each
group have different intuitions about Charles’ case, they effectively respond to
different questions. On this account, Swain et al.’s subjects tried to provide
meaningful, informative responses to the survey questions. They assumed,
quite reasonably, that the researchers know that Dave’s is not a case of
knowledge, and that the researchers know that the subjects know this (mutatis
mutandis for Karen). Given that the researchers aim to make all of their
contributions to the conversation relevant as Grice’s co-operative principle
requires, that they have asked such a prima facie obvious question needs
explaining. Happily for subjects, an explanation becomes apparent as soon
as they encounter Charles’ more problematic case: the researchers want me to
compare Charles’ case to Dave’s. (Intelligent subjects could hardly fail to notice
that the cases are purposefully chosen to contrast with one another!) On this
reading, Swain et al.’s subjects answer that Charles’ case is more obviously a
case of knowledge than Dave’s and less obviously a case of knowledge than
Karen’s. And of course they’re right.
Swain et al. manipulate the context in which their subjects judge the
Truetemp case so as to present those judgments out of context and conclude
that they are influenced by “irrelevant factors”—“fairly minor and recent
perturbations in their cognitive environment” (Alexander and Weinberg 2007,
p. 67). It may well be true that the order in which a series of cases is considered
should not influence the applicability of a concept to any one of those cases.
Swain et al.’s results are consistent with this. What Swain et al. have not
considered is that within the conversational context in which their subjects
consider Charles’ case, the ordering is highly relevant: it helps to determine
the very meaning of their subjects’ task.
I think this account is prima facie plausible—but we are doing experimental
philosophy. So how can we test it? Strack et al. (1988) demonstrated how
Grice’s Maxim of Quantity mediates question order effects in part-whole
question sequences. They were able to effectively switch the non-redundancy
norm off by manipulating the conversational context with explicit lead-in
questions. Though Swain et al.’s surveys are more subtle, on the reading I am
urging their results are also the effect of conversational norms guiding subjects’
interpretation of the task. Thus it should be possible to substantially reduce the
contrast effect by manipulating the conversational context in which subjects
consider the cases.
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3.83.63.43.23.02.82.62.42.22.0
Charles first (SAW)
Charles first (SC)
Charles after Dave (SAW)
Charles after Dave (SC)
Chart 1 Mean response to Charles: Swain et al. and SC showing 95% CIs. CIs for Swain et al.’s
means were estimated from their charts
In Swain et al.’s experiment the instructions to subjects were:
We are investigating what different people’s opinions are about knowl-
edge. In each question, please indicate to what extent you agree or
disagree with that statement.
To test the present hypothesis I prefaced Swain et al.’s original Dave-then-
Charles survey with the following lead-in:4
We are designing a survey for a cognitive science experiment explor-
ing people’s concept of knowledge. This involves testing prospective
questions.
We are interested in your response to two questions, one of which
might be included in the final survey. Please consider each independently.
When this lead-in is used, the average response to Charles’ case after Dave’s
is 2.58.5 This is not significantly different to the baseline Swain et al. established
4By far the most significant effect Swain et al. uncovered is Dave’s case on Charles’ (p = 0.043). It
therefore makes sense to test this case first.
5Responses are coded from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Prospective subjects were
approached at two Melbourne cafés. The experimenters introduced themselves and read the lead-
in which was also printed at the top of the page. No demographic data was collected.
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when they tested subjects’ reactions to Charles’ case considered first, and
which I have closely replicated (see Chart 1, Charles first (SC)). Comparing
subjects who considered Dave’s case before considering Charles’ (N = 26;
mean response to Charles = 2.58 [95%CI: 2.06–3.01]) to those who considered
Charles’ first (N = 24; mean response = 2.5 [95%CI: 2.94–2.06]) shows that
subjects’ judgments about Charles’ case are not affected by first considering
Dave’s (p = 0.8). Further experiments are clearly needed (and underway), but
it appears from this preliminary data that when the conversational context is
made explicit in this way, the priming effect disappears.
The present hypothesis also explains why Swain et al. found that responses
to Charles’ case did not shift when subjects considered it after responding to
a more problematic case “expected to generate mixed intuitions with some
subjects willing to attribute knowledge, and others not” (2008, p. 143). Because
this problematic case is less extreme than either Karen’s or Dave’s, the contrast
between it and Charles’ case is also less extreme. Thus it is not clear to subjects
what, if any, the comparison is supposed to be. The present hypothesis predicts
that under these conditions there will be no substantial shift in responses to
Charles’ case (cf. Schwarz et al. 1991, p. 19), which is exactly what Swain et al.
found.
Our purpose, however, is not to provide a definitive pragmatic account of
Swain et al.’s data, but to consider the methodology and assumptions which
underlie it. Swain et al. draw the following meta-methodological conclusion
from their results:
The fact that people’s intuitions about particular thought-experiments
vary based on what other things they have been thinking about recently
is troubling. Philosophers who rely on thought-experiments should be
especially concerned about findings that indicate that, at least in some
cases, subjects’ intuitions are easily influenced (ibid.).
Swain et al. (and many others) clearly assume that the context in which
their philosophically innocent and experimentally naïve subjects consider the
Truetemp case is in all relevant respects identical to that in which philosophers
consider Lehrer’s Truetemp thought-experiment. Here, then, are just three
crucial differences which Swain et al.’s methodology must address:
1. Swain et al.’s subjects must try to understand why on earth anyone would
ask such a bizarre, hardly intelligible question as whether a unreflective
human thermometer knows that it’s 71 degrees. Philosophers understand
that the only salient fact about Charles is that he has no introspective access
to the basis of his beliefs.
2. Swain et al.’s subjects try hard to provide intelligent responses to the
surveys, taking into account the likely interests of the researchers (see, e.g.,
S. Cullen
Norenzayan and Schwarz 1999; Schwarz 1995, 1996).6 Philosophers simply
try to respond to the thought-experiment as they understand it.
3. Swain et al.’s subjects interpret the survey vignette in a highly ambiguous
conversational context. Philosophers understand the point and purpose of
considering thought-experiments—and as we have seen, priming effects
can disappear when the conversational context is made explicit (cf. Strack
et al. 1988; Schwarz et al. 1991).
Swain et al. therefore provide little reason to believe their “data impugning
various intuitions to present a real challenge for philosophers who wish to
rely on intuitions as evidence”. Rather, they provide a clear example of the
fallacy of Survey-Driven Romanticism, that one may read off subjects’ intu-
itions about the philosophically interesting features of unusual, unexplicated
scenarios, from their survey responses.
3 Survey Pragmatics: Response Alternatives
We have so far examined how changes to the context surrounding a survey
can affect how subjects interpret its vignette and questions. The following
experiments examine how the formal structure of the survey itself can bear
on subjects’ responses.
3.1 Methods
Predominantly high-school aged (72% [95% CI: 69 – 75]) North American
(93% [95% CI: 89 – 97]) subjects participated in surveys using the online
survey website “Quibblo”. Subjects selected surveys by searching for topics
and keywords of interest or by browsing the titles of recently posted or popular
surveys.
Concerns about possible biases meant that experiments were replicated
throughout the study. The results of these replications were highly consistent
(see Chart 2). The online appendix contains a discussion including replication
6In my survey of students at Melbourne University, a number of subjects made their guesses about
the purpose of the research explicit in the open feedback question. One example is this student,
evidently puzzled by the Gettier case she considered:
I had to think about this for a long time. Its about accepting that you can know anything.
[The person in the vignette] bases their belief on previous experience [. . . ]. But the situation
that is described makes me realise that there is no way to be sure you know anything. . . .
This student guessed that the experiment was about “accepting that you can know anything”. The
experiment’s conversational context raised her standard for answering “really knows” to truly
Cartesian heights: she did produce the philosophers’ response, viz., that the agent only believes
that p, but for an entirely dif ferent reason to philosophers’. This was a very common theme in
the students’ feedback (which is collected in the online appendix). Many who answered “only
believes” claimed to have done so because, to quote another student’s response, “nobody can ever
truly KNOW anything”.
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100%7550250%-25-50-75-100%
Vignette 1
Vignette 2
Vignette 3
Vignette 4
Vignette 5
Vignette 6
Vignette 7
p = .85
p = .65
p = .6
p = .9
p = .6
p = .85
p = .4
Chart 2 Estimate of percentage difference between original result and subsequent replications
with 95%CIs. Note that all experiments were replicated within 5% of the original results. The
vignettes referenced in this chart can be found in the online appendix
data. All p-values reported are two-tailed and calculated using Fisher’s exact
test; confidence intervals are 95% (exact).
3.2 Dichotomous vs. Non-dichotomous Questions
Dichotomous “yes/no” questions present subjects with mutually exclusive and
exhaustive response alternatives: “Does Sarah know that p? Yes or No”. Non-
dichotomous questions present response alternatives which are not simply the
assertion and denial of the same proposition: “Does Sarah know that p, or does
she only believe it?”, and “Does Sarah know that p, or does she really know
that p?” (the latter being non-dichotomous owing to the intensifying “really”).
To what extent do Weinberg et al.’s (2006) results depend on their decision
to use a non-dichotomous question scheme? I hypothesised that subjects would
be more likely to answer “knows” to the question “Does S know that p?”,
than “really knows” to the question “Does S really know that p, or does he
only believe it?” For the intensifying degree adverb really implicates a higher
standard for knowledge than simply “knows”, and the downtoning adverb only
in “only believes” implicates a lower standard for belief.
The following experiments retest a number of Weinberg et al.’s surveys, only
this time their questions and response alternatives are phrased dichotomously.
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In Section 3.4 we will return to consider Weinberg et al.’s arguments in light of
our findings.
3.2.1 Results
I first attempted to replicate the results Weinberg et al. found when they
conducted the following survey in their (2006) study:
Bob has a friend, Jill, who has driven a Buick for many years. Bob
therefore thinks that Jill drives an American car. He is not aware,
however, that her Buick has recently been stolen, and he is also not
aware that Jill has replaced it with a Pontiac, which is a different kind
of American car.
Does Bob really know that Jill drives an American car, or does he only
believe it? [REALLY KNOWS/ONLY BELIEVES]
74% of Weinberg et al.’s subjects (N = 66) responded “only believes”. My
replication of their experiment produced effectively identical results: 71% of
my subjects (N = 233) responded “only believes”.
I then retested the vignette with the following difference: I asked simply
“Does Bob know that Jill drives an American car?”, and allowed as response
alternatives just “knows” and “does not know”. As expected, subjects were
substantially more likely to attribute knowledge: 42% in the dichotomous
group answered “knows”, where only 29% had answered “really knows” in
the non-dichotomous group (p = .03).
Intrigued by this result, I was interested to know whether the effect was
robust. The experiment was repeated using Weinberg et al.’s Truetemp vi-
gnette (§2.1). Subjects in the non-dichotomous group (N = 70) were asked,
following Weinberg et al., “Does Charles really know that it is 71 degrees in
the room, or does he only believe it?”, their response alternatives being “really
knows” and “only believes”. Subjects in the dichotomous group (N = 214)
were asked simply “Does Charles know that it is 71 degrees in the room?”,
their response alternatives being “knows” and “does not know”. The results
were even more striking. Only 28% of subjects in the non-dichotomous group
answered “really knows”,7 compared with 57% of subjects in the dichotomous
group who answered “knows” (p < .0001)—that is, subjects were twice as likely
to respond “knows” than “really knows” (see Chart 3).
The effect of switching from non-dichotomous to dichotomous questions
and response alternatives proved robust. Further experiments returned size-
able and highly statistically significant results (p = .0004; p = .0016) (see
Chart 4). I conclude that responses to Weinberg et al.’s surveys vary dramat-
7This result replicates Weinberg et al.’s finding: 32% of their Western subjects (N = 189) answered
“really knows”.
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Chart 3 “Truetemp”. This
chart makes the effect of
changing response
alternatives vividly clear. The
important measure, however,
is the difference in the
proportions of responses, i.e.,
57% (knows) − 28% (really
knows) = 29%. This
difference is represented in
Chart 4 by a point at 29%
with whiskers indicating 95%
confidence intervals
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%Knows
%Does not know
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43
ically according to whether the questions and their response alternatives are
phrased dichotomously or non-dichotomously.
3.3 Forced-choices and Likert Scales
In an experiment involving fifty-two undergraduates at Melbourne University,
I asked subjects to comment on why they answered various forced-choice
questions as they did. Their responses (reproduced in the online appendix)
raised a number of subtle and occasionally rather idiosyncratic distinctions.
5040302010
p < .0001
Truetemp
p = .0004
Broken Clock
p = .0016
Emmy Awards
0
Chart 4 Estimate of percentage difference (mean ‘knows’ response − mean ‘really knows’
response) with 95%CIs. Vignettes not referenced in this text can be found in the online appendix
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Consider, for example, the following students’ responses to the Truetemp
vignette from the previous section:
1. Charles only “believes” because he’s got no reason to think he’d be spot
on, it’s just a guess as far as he’s concerned. Perhaps if he’d been noticing
on occasion after occasion that he’s guessing the right temperature, then
he would get to the stage where [we] could say “he knows”.
2. Charles’ belief is influenced by a sub-conscious activity in his brain. For
his belief to become knowledge, he would have to become aware that he
has some kind of crazy human thermometer power, and thus know that his
brain can tell the temperature. Now it is just a strange, instinctive belief.
Lehrer (1990) meant to elicit (and of course typically succeeded in elicit-
ing) strong intuitions in favour of internalism using his Truetemp thought-
experiment, on which Weinberg et al.’s vignette is closely modeled. Although
most subjects produced paradigm internalist type reasoning like the two
examples above, there were some interesting exceptions.8 One example is the
following student:
3. The brain itself has been rewired [. . . ] There seems to be less subjectivity
with this, making it seem like the person knows it is correct, rather than
it simply being opinion. If there had been other reasons why the person
thought the temperature was as it was—such as they were sweating, or
cold, then it would influence their belief about the actual temperature. In
fact, the lack of these external factors is more likely to influence the person
into thinking it is a temperature other than what they know it is.
Indeed, almost all subjects explicitly cited the internalist intuition that in order
to count as knowing that p, one must be aware of one’s reasons for believing
p, in support of their responses. This last student, however, cited Charles’
ignorance in support of the opposite, distinctly externalist conclusion!
Whenever experimental philosophers force subjects to respond to conceptu-
ally complex scenarios by choosing one of two mutually exclusive answers, they
risk misrepresenting the structure and subtleties of folk concepts, and their
subjects’ understanding of the scenarios. (For an example of this last point, see
Guglielmo and Malle 2008, manuscript submitted for publication). One might
therefore wonder to what degree experimental philosophers’ survey results
depend on their choice of response format. If forced-choice results are not
roughly replicable with Likert scales (and visa versa), we have another reason
to doubt that surveys can straightforwardly reveal subjects’ intuitions. Rather,
they would be measuring, in part, differences in subjects’ responses to another
formal feature of the questionnaire.
8Responses were sorted by two people, one blind to the hypothesis of the study, into four
categories: “internalist”, “externalist”, “sceptical”, and “other”. Agreement was high (>90%)
about which responses indicated the internalist or externalist intuitions.
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3.3.1 Results
In the first experiment subjects were asked:
Two-thousand years ago, people had excellent reasons for believing that
the Earth was flat. Did they know the Earth was flat? [Yes, they knew /
No, they did not know].
On the left of Chart 5 are the results found with the forced-choice format,
on the right are those found using a 7-point Likert scale. 86% of subjects
who answered the forced-choice survey (N = 361), compared with only 34%
who answered the Likert scale survey (N = 248), selected “No, they didn’t
know”. Alternatively, counting all responses on the left-hand side of the scale
(including half of those in the middle) gives 44% “Yes, they knew”—compared
with only 14% in the forced-choice format. In other words, using a Likert scale
increased the number of “knows” responses three-fold (p < .0001).
Further, in the forced condition over 50% of subjects reported being “very
confident” of their answers and less than 15% reported being “somewhat
uncertain”; in the Likert- condition only 35% of subjects (N = 248) reported
being “very confident” and 26% reported being “somewhat uncertain”.
The experiment was repeated using Weinberg et al.’s “Buick/Pontiac”
vignette (§3.2.1) with a 5-point Likert scale. Only 32% of subjects in the Likert
condition (N = 498) selected “only believes”, compared with 71% of subjects
who responded to the forced-choice question (N = 233) (See Chart 6).
Although it is prima facie plausible that Likert scales allow respondents to
express their semantic intuitions more faithfully—i.e., that their concepts may
not unequivocally apply or fail to apply to the case at hand—there is a plau-
sible pragmatic explanation for these results which we should not overlook.
Respondents might interpret the presence of a Likert scale as indicating that
researchers regard a question as being somewhat complex. When the question
appears at first blush exceedingly obvious—as my question about what people
Chart 5 “Factivity”.
N f orced = 361; NLikert = 248.
The scale was numerically
labelled with extreme anchors
‘Yes, they knew’ and ‘No,
they didn’t know’
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Chart 6 “Buick/Pontiac”.
N f orced = 233; NLikert = 498.
Numerically labelled scale
with extreme anchors ‘Really
knows’ (left) and ‘Only
believes’ (right)
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2000 years ago knew about the spherical shape of the earth must have to many
respondents—this might prompt subjects to search for unintended subtleties.
For as we have clearly seen, respondents draw on the formal features of a
survey to help determine its intended meaning; and when asked a seemingly
obvious question, people look for an alternative interpretation, one to which
they can provide an intelligent response.
These experiments do not show that forced-choice results are somehow
flawed. Both formats have their strengths and problems. My point is only
that, whichever experimental philosophers choose, their results will reflect the
decision.
3.4 Is it a “Fact” that Epistemic Intuitions Vary from Culture to Culture?
Now that we have seen how sensitive responses are to the survey’s answer
format, let us return to Weinberg et al.’s (2006) study where they hypothe-
sised that “epistemic intuitions vary from culture to culture [and] from one
socio-economic group to another” (ibid., p. 201). To test this hypothesis
Weinberg et al. surveyed Western, East Asian, and Indian sub-continental
subjects, all recruited from Rutgers University, and high and low socio-
economic [SES] groups, recruited from “outside various commercial venues
in down town New Brunswick . . . ” (ibid.). After presenting subjects with a
vignette describing a possible case of knowledge, all of their surveys concluded
with a question of the form “Does S really know that p, or does s/he only
believe it?”
Weinberg et al. found statistically significant (though frequently not terribly
large) differences between the responses of Western, East Asian, and Indian
sub-continental subjects, and between the responses of low- and high-SES
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subjects, using a number of different survey vignettes. They conclude that their
results,
look to be yet another serious embarrassment for the advocates of IDR
[Intuition Driven Romanticism] . . . [T]hey must either argue that these
intuitive differences [between cultural groups and between SES groups]
would not lead to different normative conclusions, or they must bite the
bullet and argue that diverging normative claims are genuinely norma-
tive, and thus that the sorts of doxastic states that ought to be pursued by
relatively rich and well educated people are significantly different from
the sorts of doxastic states that poor and less well educated folks should
seek. We don’t pretend to have an argument showing that neither of these
options is defensible. But we certainly don’t envy the predicament of the
IDR advocate who has to opt for one or the other (ibid., p. 212).
Yet these are clearly not the only alternatives the Intuition Driven
Romanticist might opt for, since both presuppose that Weinberg et al.’s
non-dichotomous forced-choice surveys were measuring subjects’ epistemic in-
tuitions. Given how sensitive their results are to the survey’s formal design, an
obvious alternative is that Weinberg et al. were measuring, inter alia, different
cultures’ and different SES groups’ reactions to the pragmatic features of their
surveys, and not just reporting “brute facts” about intuitions (ibid., p. 215).
Now perhaps Weinberg et al. might reply:
The subjects in our inter-cultural experiments all respond to identical
surveys, under identical circumstances. Therefore, when a substantial ma-
jority of East Asian subjects answer “really knows” to (e.g.) our Gettier-
scenario, while the vast majority of Western subjects respond “only
believes”, we can be confident that it’s because of their differing epistemic
intuitions and not because of any pragmatic features of our surveys. It
couldn’t be due to pragmatic influences, since there is no identifiable
difference in their pragmatic situations. Therefore, the Westerners and
East Asians in our subject population at Rutgers University indeed have
systematically varying epistemic intuitions.
Such a reply, however, would rest on a mistake. For it assumes that their
Western and East Asian subjects, and low- and high-SES subjects, all respond
alike to the potent pragmatic features of Weinberg et al.’s surveys. There are
many reasons to believe that this assumption is false and that different groups
have systematically different responses to the demands of an experimental
survey. Here, then, are just three relevant examples from the current literature:
1. Attention to pragmatic cues contained in the survey varies between collec-
tivist and individualist cultures. Chinese subjects “are more sensitive to
conversational norms and go to more effort to observe the maxims of
conversational conduct” than Western subjects (Haberstroh et al. 2002,
p. 325, also see Oyserman et al. 2002). Haberstroh et al. note that ig-
noring these differences risks “misinterpreting cultural differences in the
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question-answering process as substantive differences in the phenomenon
under study” (p. 328; also see Welkenhuysen-Gybels et al. 2003 for an
interesting discussion).
2. Survey response styles vary across cultures. Differences in cultural response
styles are well-known and have been studied for over 50 years. John-
son et al. (2005, p. 267) note that since people from individualist (e.g.,
American) cultures tend to be “less concerned with the consequences of
expressing strong opinions”, they are more prone to extreme response
styles (e.g., using the end-points of a Likert scale) than people from
collectivist (e.g., East Asian) cultures. Conversely, response acquiescence
(‘yes’-saying) is lower among people from individualist cultures. Cultural
differences like these are summarised by Hofstede (2001, p. 218) who notes
that “respondents in a more collectivist culture are more sensitive to the
social pressure they perceive to be emanating from the questionnaire”.
3. Question comprehension and literacy vary systematically between high- and
low-SES groups. Holbrook et al. (2007, p. 332) note that “years of edu-
cation among adults is very strongly correlated with scores on direct tests
of cognitive skills” (cf. Weinberg et al. 2006, p. 210). Further, optimally
answering surveys is cognitively demanding (Krosnick 1999); especially,
one imagines, in the case of experimental philosophy surveys. Since only
a small number of subjects in Weinberg et al.’s study were classed as low-
SES, a failure to grasp (or correctly read) their needlessly complex survey
vignettes in even a moderate proportion of subjects could dramatically
affect their findings.
There are many more, but these examples suffice to illustrate two things.
First, we cannot assume that the differences in Weinberg et al.’s Western
and East Asian, or low- and high-SES subjects’ survey responses are due to
underlying differences in epistemic intuitions; these differences could be due
to a great many things which their methodology says absolutely nothing about.
Second, at no point do Weinberg et al. consider any possibilities like those
considered here; rather, they simply conclude that these groups have different
epistemic intuitions. This may be the case, but from their data alone it is far
from obvious.
4 Conclusion
Research has repeatedly shown that subjects rely on pragmatic cues and
conversational norms to generate intelligent responses to survey question-
naires. It is only by effectively identifying intuitions with survey responses that
experimental philosophers have been able to conclude that “intuitions . . . vary
according to whether, and which, other thought experiments are considered
first”, or that it is a “fact that epistemic intuitions vary systematically with
culture and [socioeconomic status]”. These assertions are not made on the
basis of “straightforward data about people’s intuitions concerning specific
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cases”; rather, they are made on the basis of how people are inclined to
use certain English words like “really knows” and “only believes” within the
unusual conversational context of an experimental philosophy survey.
Experimental philosophers are right to emphasise that appeals to intuition
are typically empirical claims about the linguistic behaviour of competent
speakers. And I think they are right to suspect that what philosophers find
intuitive might diverge from what lay-people find intuitive. My concern here
has not been with the motivation for experimental philosophy; rather, I want to
urge experimental philosophers to re-examine their underlying methodologi-
cal assumptions.
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